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cial justification. It would probably be more accurate to say that 
some form of judicial review is now the norm in democracies. 
There are a lot of interesting things for constitutional scholars 
to look into. Unfortunately (given its prominence in recent years), 
grand theory doesn't seem to be one of them. 
DAVID P. BRYDEN37 
The other day I received, as an alumnus, a message from Dean 
Vorenberg of Harvard Law School. Listing some of the school's 
achievements, he related that Harvard now has "13 courses and 
seminars in constitutional law, in addition to five sections of the 
basic 'second-year' course," plus "six courses in the field of interna-
tional human rights." If this issue of Constitutional Commentary 
survives until the twenty-fifth century, I suspect that the dean's rev-
elation will be interesting to students of twentieth-century Ameri-
can culture. 
As Americans, as lawyers, and as constitutional scholars, we 
take rights very seriously indeed. In a citizen this is sometimes a 
virtue, but in a scholar it is more often a vice. Many of our readers 
have never studied the history of liberty except in a constitutional 
law course. For this and other reasons, they are in perpetual danger 
of equating the progress of liberty with the progress of law, and the 
progress of law with the progress of constitutional rights. 
We begin with cases; almost inevitably we often treat doctrine 
as an end in itself, a tendency that is reinforced by normal human 
laziness as well as the quest for maximum scholarly output. 
Although we know better, we habitually imply-if only by our si-
lence- that if the Court hadn't acted nothing would have been 
done about a problem, and that the Court's decision had important 
consequences. Prior to Muller, we imply, working hours were not 
growing shorter except under statutory compulsion; after Muller, 
our readers are left to infer, the problem was solved. Miranda, we 
presume, created dramatic new realities in the interrogation room. 
Griswold, some imply, was a landmark in the evolution of sexual 
liberty; I doubt that most law students could even begin to describe 
the origins-mostly non-legal--of privacy in the home. Roe was 
necessary, says popular mythology, because legislatures weren't re-
forming abortion laws; and if it is overruled abortion "will be ille-
gal." Such assumptions are often half-truths at best. Left 
unchallenged, they fortify the American tendency to over-glorify 
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the Supreme Court, and correspondingly to deprecate democratic 
politics. 
Rights are inspiring, and that's important, but the old ladies on 
the city bus have less need of new constitutional rights than of lower 
prices and safer neighborhoods. Glorification of rights tends to en-
tail neglect of interests that cannot easily be enforced by litigation 
and overreliance on the Supreme Court to solve the country's 
problems. It isn't just a question of "legitimacy"; it's also a ques-
tion of realistic expectations. In the 1960s many liberals looked to 
the courts to restore environmental quality. They won some impor-
tant victories, but on the whole they vastly overestimated what 
could be achieved by creation of new environmental rights. Now 
feminists are making the same mistake in their quixotic effort to 
stop pornography through suits by rape victims and their unrealis-
tic faith in the liberating power of an Equal Rights Amendment. 
The ghost dance of litigation also appeals to the Right: many con-
servatives, while sincerely deploring judicial usurpations, want a 
Balanced Budget Amendment, so that the judges can legitimately 
stop deficit spending! The same mentality is reflected in Harvard's 
constitutional curriculum. 
Even in the areas where rights work best their importance is 
usually exaggerated by hyperbole from both sides as well as the me-
dia. Remember, we aren't talking about the rack and the screw; 
we're talking about whether kids may wear arm bands to an arith-
metic class. Our "fundamental" rights cases now often involve 
rights that are nowhere near being fundamental. In America today, 
the important restraints on liberty are not due to lack of legal rights, 
and they are therefore not removable by creation of new rights. For 
example, there is virtually unlimited legal freedom of speech on our 
campuses. The Constitution in its majestic equality allows both 
George McGovern and Jeane Kirkpatrick to speak at Berkeley. 
But the informal constraints on the exercise of that freedom are 
extremely powerful, whenever the speaker's position is unpopular 
within the university community, which is to say whenever freedom 
of speech matters. That, it seems to me, is a much more important 
problem than the constitutional status of sound trucks and dirty 
monologues. It's not "law," but if we don't study it, who will? 
We might give our readers and students a better perspective on 
the Court's role if we addressed "constitutional problems" instead 
of "constitutional law": freedom of expression during World War 
I, for example, instead of just Schenck and Abrams. We would then 
view the Court as one of the forces-sometimes major, more often 
minor-that has affected social progress. Of course, this ideal isn't 
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wholly attainable; we are, after all, specialists. But our specialty is 
not like music or ceramics, subjects best taught by someone on fire 
with the delusion that a concerto or a vase is the center of the 
universe. 
Perhaps an infusion of comparative law would help to illumi-
nate the role of doctrine. I've always thought it strange that we put 
legal history and comparative law in special courses, as esoteric, 
optional subjects, taught by isolated professors. This is done, pre-
sumably, because the mainline teachers don't wish, or don't feel 
able, to incorporate comparative perspectives in their courses. As a 
result, we never ask some of the most basic questions about the 
Constitution. For example, what (tangible or intangible) difference 
does it make to an atheist, or a Jew, Methodist, or Catholic to live 
in England rather than in the United States? How much of the 
difference is due to the established church, or other practices that 
our Constitution has been interpreted to prohibit? Does the degree 
of actual freedom of speech in a democracy correlate closely with 
the degree to which its constitution appears to guarantee such free-
dom? Or the degree to which its courts have a role in enforcing its 
constitution? Is judicial review more necessary here than in some 
other countries? How much political freedom is compatible with 
socialism? Those questions are more fundamental than most of the 
ones that we ask in our required Constitutional Law courses. The 
answers-however inexact they may be-belong in the literature of 
constitutional law. 
Constitutional scholarship furnishes many illustrations of 
Nietzsche's dictum that "convictions are more dangerous enemies 
of truth than lies." The legal mind tends to characterize decisions 
as simply "right" or "wrong"; so does the partisan political mind. 
In some fields, that doesn't trouble me, but in constitutional law, 
where the problems are often polycentric, that sort of thinking is 
inadequate. Our treatment of pre-1937 economic regulation cases, 
for example, is often crudely biased. Most histories of the Lochner 
and New Deal eras are full of innuendoes to the effect that the cor-
porate side represented an outmoded "individualist" or "Social 
Darwinist" ethic, while the government side represented the inter-
ests of the common man. No complexities, nuances, or imponder-
ables-just Good versus Evil. This is not so much argued as taken 
for granted, like the superiority of democracy to dictatorship. Yet 
the Lochner era was more than Lochner; it was also hundreds of 
cases-Euclid, Adkins, and Blaisdell, for instance-in which it's not 
at all clear that the law was beneficial to the poor. I'd like to see 
more dispassionate analyses of these cases, including their place 
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within the general evolution of the economy, by scholars with fewer 
preconceptions. 
One needn't be nihilistic about constitutional meaning to rec-
ognize the obvious fact that the Constitution is a wonderful political 
Rorschach test. Sometimes, to be sure, the ink blot does look like a 
bat. When it does, let's say so. But if we've got bats on our mind, 
let's talk about them now and then. Too often, constitutional de-
bates are disguised political debates. It might be helpful to put the 
legal issues aside occasionally and engage in some frankly utopian 
thinking about the composition, selection, duties, and methods of 
the Supreme Court, as well as the language of the Constitution. 
These utopias would not necessarily be unrealistic except in the 
sense that any sudden and radical change in our political system is 
unrealistic. A single author might draft a series of alternative uto-
pias, one of which might call for a totally political "Court" while at 
the other extreme another utopia might try to confine the Court's 
discretion by eliminating some of the ambiguities of our present 
Constitution, just as the Canadians have done. I envision these uto-
pias not as practical proposals but as pedagogic and analytical tools 
that might help to sharpen some of our discussions of constitutional 
jurisprudence. For example, instead of straining to prove that the 
real Constitution authorizes (or doesn't authorize) substantive eco-
nomic due process, let's discuss whether an ideal Constitution 
would do so. Instead of limiting ourselves to the question whether 
this or that decision converts the Court into a Council of Revision, 
let's discuss whether we want a Council of Revision. Might it not 
be preferable in some ways? In short, let's spend more of our time 
discussing first principles. 
